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Abstract
Predictive analytics are data-driven software
tools that draw on confirmed relationships between
variables to predict future outcomes. Hence they may
provide government with new analytical capabilities
for enhancing policy decision-making effectiveness in
turbulent environments. However, predictive
analytics system use research is still lacking.
Therefore, this study adapts the existing model of
strategic decision-making effectiveness to examine
government use of predictive analytics in turbulent
times and to identify barriers to using information
effectively in enhancing policy decision making
effectiveness. We use a case study research to
address two research questions in the context of the
2011 Fukushima nuclear accident. Our study found
varying levels of proactive use of SPEEDI predictive
analytics system during the escalating nuclear
reactor meltdowns between Japan’s central
government agencies and between the central and the
state government levels. Using the model, we argue
that procedural rationality and political behavior can
be used to explain some observed variations.

1. Introduction
Using information effectively in policy decisionmaking under normal conditions faces added
complexity from various internal and external
factors: (1) datification in government, (2) the rise of
big data in government characterized by volume
(scale of data), variety (different data formats),
velocity (streaming data) and veracity (uncertain data
quality), and (3) technological drivers such as social
media platforms, mobile computing, and cloud
computing in government. Moreover, policy makers
in many countries face greater complexity in making
effective use of information for policy decisions to
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produce desired policy impacts in turbulent times in
high-velocity external environments, in no small part
due to natural disasters and man-made disasters such
as mass international movement of refugees, urban
terror attacks, oil spills and nuclear accidents [11, 12,
20, 39, 55].
In the private sector, which faces not only
turbulent but also competitive decision environments,
big data, business intelligence, and business analytics
have been increasingly adopted and used to enhance
organizational, analytical capabilities such as
organizational memory, information integration,
insight creation and visual presentation [43],
managerial decision-making effectiveness [10],
organizational performance [30, 44], and supply
chain performance [51, 56]. In contrast, while the use
of big data [21], business intelligence, and business
analytics tools by large-size local governments in the
U.S. has been studied for enhanced public services in
the e-government field [13], there remains a relative
lack of knowledge and understanding about effective
business analytics use in a policy decision-making
context in turbulent times.
Therefore, this paper aims to explore the
following two inter-related research questions: (1)
How does government – policy experts and decision
makers – use information produced by predictive
analytics systems in a way which they influence good
policy choices in turbulent times? (2) What are
technological, political, and institutional barriers to
proactive use of predictive analytics systems? We
address these research questions by adopting a
“Model of Strategic Decision-Making Effectiveness”
[15, p. 373], because this model provides variables
which are relevant to our topic of policy decisionmaking effectiveness made in turbulent times.
However, we modify the model by adding a new
variable: information technology (IT) use/predictive
analytics system use.
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A specific research context draws on the 3.11
compound catastrophe that devastated Fukushima
prefecture at the north eastern part of Japan. In the
immediate aftermath of the March 11 2011 Japan
Great East Earthquake and the subsequent tsunamis
in excess of 14 meters, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant (herein called “F1” by its owner, Tokyo
Electric Power Company, Ltd. – TEPCO) lost both
main external power supplies and internal back-up
generators, causing reactor core meltdowns which
were rated as Level 7 (the worst kind) by The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In this
policy decision-making context, Japan’s policy
makers showed the varying levels of intensive use of
an advanced predictive analytics distributed network
system – “System for Prediction of Environmental
Emergency Dose Information Network System”
(referred to as “SPEEDI”).
While our research context is the compound
catastrophe, this paper’s central focus is not disaster
management research. It is centrally focused on the
varying use of SPEEDI-generated information and its
impacts on policy decision-making effectiveness that
influenced the critical mass evacuation policy
choices.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: A
review of relevant literatures is presented in Section
2. Our research context is described in Section 3.
Section 4 describes our research methodology.
Section 5 discusses our key findings. Finally, Section
6 presents our discussion and conclusions.

2. Literature review
2.1. Policy decision-making effectiveness in
turbulent times
“A Model of Strategic Decision-Making
Effectiveness” explicates private-sector strategic
decision process and strategic decision-making
effectiveness [15, p. 373]. Despite its original
private-sector orientation, the model identifies
variables of importance to study strategic decisions.
We further hold that the government’s policy
decisions made in turbulent times are largely
strategic decisions in that they are designed to
influence favorably the key factors such as resource
allocation, knowledge sharing, and stakeholder buyin on which the desired policy outcomes critically
depend. Moreover, we modified the original model
by adding a new model concept: use of IT, because
recent studies show the impacts of IT-enabled
organizational agility [36, 48] customer agility [31,
41] in sensing and responding to rapidly changing
decision environments in turbulent times.

The original model postulates that strategic
decision-making effectiveness (SDME) is a function
of presence of procedural rationality (PR) and
absence of political behavior (PB) [15]. The model
identifies environmental favorability (EF) and quality
of implementation (QI) as control variables that are
outside the main focus of their study but can
indirectly influence strategic decision-making
effectiveness. Finally, environmental instability (EI)
positively moderates the relationship between PR and
SDME and the relationship between EF and SDME.
Figure 1 shows this Model in a modified graphical
presentation. A solid line shows a direct effect,
whereas a dotted line shows an indirect effect.
Procedural rationality is defined as the extent to
which decision processes involve the collection of
relevant information and the analysis of this
information to make a right choice which can lead to
SDMD. Political behavior is the result of decision
makers in organizations having different self-interests
and being able to use their political influence on
decisions, which can hinder achieving SDME.

Figure 1. A model of strategic decisionmaking effectiveness
Environmental instability is defined as a
dynamically changing external environment that
results from a shift in market demand and the
introduction of new disruptive technologies. Because
PR basically represents the collective information
processing capacity, the Model argues that the
relationship between PR and SDME is stronger in
turbulent environments. Environmental favorability is
defined as “the extent to which environmental
conditions subsequent to a decision favor the choice
that was made.” [15, p. 377]. Finally, the quality of
decision implementation underscores the competence
with which the proper steps are taken to execute the
strategic decision. While our study adopts this model,
it must be noted that the model does not consider the
role of information technology (IT) use in enhancing
SDME.
There are increased scope, complexity, and
political aspects of crisis that make strategic and
political decision making especially challenging for
policy makers [5]. Policy makers have a tendency to
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claim they cannot be held responsible for the
occurrence of a particular crisis, while at the same
time they assume that they are well prepared for any
crisis that occurs and take effective measures to
protect the public in the event of a crisis in these fast
moving environments. Similarly, firms’ problem
solving strategies in high velocity environments
occur with a bounded rationality approach. Firms that
survived in these high velocity environments are able
to make agile decisions which enhance performance
through confidence to act, effective group processes,
and accelerated cognitive processing [16].
Traditionally, in crisis management there is an
expectation that decisions will be centralized.
However, research shows that there is multiple
decision-making taking place simultaneously such as
informal decentralization, non-decision making, and
paralysis [5]. In an examination of the Fukushima
crisis in Japan [6] argues that there is persistent myth
that crisis management operations are best organized
in a command and control mode. However, this goes
against the first phase of a crisis where there typically
is a lack of information, communication, and
coordination and it is impossible to control all first
responders. Therefore, under these circumstances
effective response is more improvised, flexible, and
networked, rather than standardized, planned, and
centrally led. The case of Fukushima was a
paradigm-shifting crisis that came as a total surprise
to the Japanese policy makers and the Japanese
government’s hyper-centralized approach to crisis
management was seriously questioned [6].
Furthermore, empirical research on the 2008 financial
crisis, when 17 European Union countries tried to
reduce their growing budgetary deficits, showed that
increased centralization of decisions leads to more
centralization throughout the system [40]. The
stronger the pressure from the outside for change
leads to greater centralized decisions.
In an analysis of government dimensions of
crisis management three important lessons have
learned [42]. First, a crisis typically raises questions
about the ineffectiveness of government agencies and
authorities in preventing the occurrence of the crisis
in the first place. Second, the frequency of
government action or inaction does not mean that
government action is always beneficial since they
may do things that could make the crisis worse.
Third, crisis and political events are found within the
political sphere and this can have a tremendous
influence on the decisions that are made during and
after a crisis [32].
In regards to policy making the challenges of
crisis management deal with several important issues
[6]. First, there are political-administrative challenges

of preparing government agencies to deal with
adverse situations that arise. Second, crisis impacts
its citizens and institutions in a fundamental way and
citizens’ must demonstrate resilience to bounce back
after the crisis to establish “normality.” Third, crisis
requires policy makers to be “deep thinkers” about
how to move effectively forward. Crisis typically
comes as a surprise to leaders and their agencies and
represents the hardest challenges that political leaders
have ever encountered. However, despite all of these
challenges, policy makers will ultimately be held
accountable for their failures.

2.2. Predictive analytics & decision-making
effectiveness
Predictive analytics are data-driven software
tools that draw on confirmed relationships between
variables to predict future outcomes. The predictions
that predictive analytics produce are often values,
indicating the likelihood of a particular behavior or
event to occur in the future [23]. Advanced analyticsdriven data analyses, which use data, text, and web
mining technologies, enable strategic decision
makers to have a full "360 degrees" view of their
operations and customers [7, p. 155]. Predictive
analytics not only generate useful models but also
complement explanatory modeling in theory building
and theory testing. Despite the importance of
predictive analytics, however, the use of predictive
analytics is still very new in the information systems
(IS) literature [3, 35, 46].
While it is not about predictive analytics use, a
survey research draws on the information processing
view and contingency theory to examine the effect of
(descriptive) business analytics use on decisionmaking effectiveness at the organizational level [10].
Structural equation modeling analysis found that
business analytics use positively influences
information processing capability in data-driven
decision environments. This in turn has a positive
effect on improving decision-making effectiveness.
Prior research showed that organizations have
largely failed to use other types of (non-predictive)
business analytics – so-called business intelligence
(BI) systems effectively – to exploit the huge
volumes of data they captured in their enterprise
resource planning (ERP) systems. BI systems use
analytics and enterprise system databases. As a result,
BI systems failed to support managerial decision
making at both the strategic and operational levels,
and hence failing to create business value through BI
investments [17, 18]. This empirical study found
evidence for the importance of BI systems
assimilation and the need for shared domain
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knowledge at the strategic and operational levels as
the drivers of BI business value. Moreover, the study
suggests the critical importance of organizational
absorptive capacity, which is the competence to
collect, absorb, and strategically leverage new
external information, in developing appropriate
technology infrastructure and assimilating BI systems
for managerial decision-making effectiveness.
Finally, the study found that operational managers'
absorptive capacity matters to leveraging BI systems,
although top management plays a significant role in
effective deployment of BI systems but their
influence is indirect. This suggests the key to
leveraging BI systems is BI systems assimilation and
use from the bottom up as opposed to the top down
[17].

3. Research context
3.1. Nuclear reactor meltdowns
A magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck east of
Sendai, Japan, northeast of Tokyo, at 14:46 on March
23, 2011. The strongest earthquake recorded in Japan
triggered enormous tsunamis of over 14 meters
(46 feet). With the epicenter of the earthquake being
so close to coastal villages and towns, 15,076 people
were drowned, 10,354 still missing, and more than
460,000 citizens were evacuated as of July 2011,
although Japan Meteorological Agency’s national
tsunami warning system issued severe tsunami early
warnings at 14:49 [45] within 3 minutes of the M9.0
earthquake. Many who were drown were trapped in
their cars which could not move due to the traffic jam
when the tsunamis arrived. They ignored police’s
repeated warnings not to use cars for evacuation for
this reason.
As the tsunamis flooded inland areas several
kilometers from shore in Fukushima prefecture of the
Tōhoku region around 15:30, F1 built on a high
ground 10 meter above the sea level was seriously
impacted. The tsunamis destroyed the two main
power supplies as well as the backup power
generators in the basement at 15:42, having rendered
all the mission-critical systems inoperable at Reactors
1-3 for a sustained period of time, including the
nuclear reactor cooling systems, containment
systems, the sensor-based environmental radiation
monitoring systems, reactor control rooms’
information
systems,
electrical
equipment,
transformers and safety equipment. Furthermore, an
off-site nuclear emergency command and control
center for F1 was also powerless and could not
perform its emergency command, control,
coordination, and communication functions.

The central government issued the F1 nuclear
emergency declaration at 19:03 on March 11. Despite
the frantic efforts to regain control over the rapidly
evolving nuclear emergency, nuclear reactor core
meltdowns occurred at the F1 site, with a powerful
explosion at the No. 1 reactor at 15:36 on March 12,
another explosion at the No. 3 reactor at 11:01 on
March 14, and a third explosion at the No. 2 reactor
at 6:14 on March 15. In the immediate aftermath of
the No. 2 reactor explosion, hourly radioactive
material emissions reached 8,217 microsieverts near
the F1’s main gate at 8:31 on March 15 [45] and over
1,015 microsieverts soon afterwards [28] with the
detection of dangerous levels of radioactive material
in milk and other local food products on March 19
and in drinking water of Fukushima’s five local
government areas on March 22 [45]. Citizens living
in the region were at the edge of the most serious
case of radioactive contamination since the former
Soviet Union’s Chernobyl disaster in 1986.
Using the International Nuclear and Radiological
Event Scale (INES) used by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), Japan Atomic Energy
Agency (JAEA) rated each reactor accident
separately. FI has six reactors and four of which were
operational at the time of the earthquake. Of the four,
the three reactors with the explosions were rated at
the Level 5, while one was rated at the Level 3.
JAEA rated the overall F1 nuclear accident as a Level
7 on the INES based on the monitoring of high
radioactive releases over days 4 to 6, with eventually
a total of some 940 PBq (I-131 eq) [28].

3.2. SPEEDI predictive analytics system
The System for Prediction of Environment
Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) is Japan’s
predictive analytics network system specifically
developed to predict and visualize the dispersion and
density of radioactive material emissions on geospatial maps and to support the national evacuation
policy decision-making effectiveness [19]. The
predictive analytics network system was built by
Fujitsu, Japan in 1986 at a cost of $US 140 million
(11 billion yen) for the Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT).
The 2016 fiscal year budget for operating SPEEDI is
Yen 710 million ($US 6.28 million) [54]. The
motivation for the initial development of SPEEDI
was US Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 1979.
In 1980 JAEA undertook the conceptual design with
an initial system being completed in 1984. With
continuous investments in hardware updates and
advanced modelling capability enhancements, the
SPEEDI network system since 2005 can
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automatically provide governments at all levels with
highly advanced predictive analytics capabilities in
providing real-time forecasts of extreme weather
events and predictions of radiation flume directions
shown on geo-spatial maps in response to nuclear
accidents and radiological emergencies.
Based on [37] Figure 2 shows a process view of
the SPEEDI network system architecture. SPEEDI
receives two other inputs: (1) meteorological data
from Japan Weather Association MICOS and (2)
radioactive material release estimate data from ERSS.
ERSS in turn receives streaming big data
automatically sent from a national distributed
network of sensors for environmental radiation
monitoring located at Japan’s 53 operational nuclear
power plants. SPEEDI operation and usage are
governed by Japan's Nuclear Safety Commission
(NUSTEC) which was established within the Cabinet
of Japan as an independent lead agency in nuclear
safety administration [62]. Importantly, once the
nuclear emergency declaration is issued by the Prime
Minister of Japan, SPEEDI use is legally mandated
through the Nuclear Safety Directive [39].

Figure 2. A process view of SPEEDI
SPEEDI predictive modeling and analytics
outputs – dispersion and density of radioactive
material emissions on geo-spatial maps – are
automatically sent to the SPEEDI Network System
terminals distributed across: (1) central, state and
local governments, (2) off-site nuclear emergency
control centers, (3) Cabinet’s nuclear emergency
response council, (4) MEXT, and (5) Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry’s (MITI) Japan
Nuclear Energy Safety Organization based on the
2012
NUSTEC’s
Environmental
Radiation
Monitoring Directive (p. 171).

4. Research methodology
In order to address the two research questions,
we have adopted a case study research methodology
which comprises field observations, ethnographic
document analysis and semi-structured case
interviews.
An ethnographic approach to document analysis
argues that “an ethnographic perspective can help
delineate patterns of human action when document
analysis is conceptualized as fieldwork” [2, p. 65].
Similarly, documents are viewed as a critical data
source in qualitative research and in the context of
conducting rigorous document analysis procedure,
including technical document [34], researchers can
have virtual field research experiences [8].
This research specifically examined three different
documents: (1) Government Report (a total of 592
pages in Japanese) compiled by National Diet of
Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent
Investigation Commission (so-called Jikochou)
chaired by Professor Kiyoshi Kurokawa, a policy
analysis expert with nine commission members with
diverse backgrounds, (2) Private-Sector Report (a
total of 403 pages with 8 pages of appendix)
compiled by Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Independent Inspection Commission (so-called
Rebuilding Japan Initiative) and (3) book (a total of
238 pages in Japanese) entitled Nuclear Crisis:
Testimony from Prime Minister of Japan and His
Cabinet written by Tetsuro Fukuyama, Deputy Chief
Cabinet Secretary and a politician of the Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) who was a key policy maker
during the reactor meltdowns. During the five days of
the intensive nuclear disaster response, Fukuyama
recorded facts and observations on four volumes of
A4 college notebooks.
Semi-structured case interviews were done with
site visits in Fukushima, Miyagi and Iwate – the three
Prefectures worst hit by the Great East Japan
Earthquake and tsunamis – were made in January
2012 prior to conducting case interviews with three
policy experts at Fukushima Prefectural (or state)
government responsible for disaster response and
evacuation policies and evacuation policy
implementation. Each semi-structured case interview
was conducted in Japanese and lasted approximately
90 minutes. An additional interview was conducted
for an hour with a middle-level manager who was
familiar with SPEEDI use. In 2012 we conducted
intensive semi-structured interviews with a local
commercial radio station, Fukushima Radio: board
members and radio announcers who had first-hand
experiences in running emergency broadcasting
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services during the compound disasters, blackouts,
and the absolute lack of official disaster information.

5. Results
5.1. Varying proactive use of SPEEDI
Despite the government investments in ERSS
and SPEEDI to support citizen protection, mass
evacuation policy development and policy
implementation in case of severe nuclear accident,
ERSS could not provide SPEEDI with timely and
accurate radioactive material release streaming big
data due to the problems with environmental
monitoring sensors located at the F1 site during the
sustained blackouts. As a result of this data quality
issue, the predictions of SPEEDI on radioactive
material dose density and dispersion directions were
viewed by the central government as “unreliable” and
its information use to formulate evacuation policies
as “too risky” for citizen safety [39, p. 383]. As early
as on March 15, 2011 – four days after the 3.11
catastrophe, Yomiuri Newspaper reported “problems
with SPEEDI” [25, p. 35] without sufficient technical
explanations of the root cause of ERSS whose
outputs fuel SPEEDI. Some nuclear scientists with
the knowledge of SPEEDI predictive analytics
capabilities started to tweet on Twitter to urge the
government to use SPEEDI [25]. Even though the use
of SPEEDI was legally mandatory in Japan, after the
Prime Minister Kan’s national nuclear emergency
declaration [29], the Kan administration’s nuclear
crisis response headquarters did not know the
existence of SPEEDI until the government's top
spokesman, Yukio Edano, was asked by journalists
why SPEEDI was not deployed to help government
more effectively respond to the enfolding nuclear
accident during one of his frequent TV interviews
[19, 25].
Against this background, however, at 16:00 on
March 11 (an hour and 14 minutes after the M9.0
earthquake devastated Fukushima), the Nuclear
Safety Technology Center responsible for the
operation of SPEEDI provided MEXT (the central
government
ministry
that
outsourced
the
development of SPEEDI) with the first SPEEDI
predictive analytics outputs in the immediate
aftermath of the F1 blackout. At this time SPEEDI
was operational in the normal operation mode. At
16:40 the operation of SPEEDI shifted to the crisis
operation mode [25]. Various mass media reported
that over 1,000 (even over 5,000) pages of SPEEDI
data/outputs were generated by NUSTEC during the
first five critical days of the F1 reactor meltdowns.

Using the geo-spatial maps of radioactive material
density and dispersion directions (SPEEDI
predictions), MEXT could send radiation monitoring
cars to collect actual real-time environmental
radiation data from the affected local areas. However,
according to Akira Tsubosaka, a senior MEXT
official responsible for the SPEEDI operation, the
Japanese central government did not publish the
SPEEDI data proactively and openly until March 23,
2011 when it was pressured to do so [19, 27, 39, 52].
Our case interview of the Fukushima Prefectural
(or state-level) government’s manager who was
knowledgeable of SPEEDI predictive analytics
capabilities acknowledged that they had received the
SPEEDI predictions automatically sent from MEXT,
which were timely used for their citizen evacuation
decisions. Other two interviewees responsible for
evacuation policy implementation observed that
while the local governments might have also received
the SPEEDI predictions, many of them lost their key
staff and suffered substantial damage to their IT
infrastructure and information processing capacity
and might not be able to use SPEEDI predictions
effectively and timely.

5.2. Mass evacuation policy conundrum
The Kan administration’s nuclear emergency
response headquarters reviewed the enfolding nuclear
crisis, under the conditions of (1) a very sporadic
limited information and knowledge sharing on the
part of TEPCO regarding the F1 nuclear crisis
response operations, and (2) the absence of local
disaster communications from the Fukushima
Prefecture governor and the local government leaders
[19]. The Kan administration’s nuclear crisis
response headquarters were particularly frustrated
with the lack of transparency and the inability of Mr.
Takekuro, TEPCO Fellow, who was purposefully colocated at the headquarters to facilitate open
information sharing and knowledge transfer between
the central government and TEPCO [19], which
raised the question of TEPCO’s institutional
trustworthiness [33]. Against these turbulent and
uncertain decision environments, the central
government, still without using SPEEDI, discussed
that a best evacuation policy option might be to use
the existing standard evacuation policy with very
limited scale nuclear emergency mass evacuation
operations, which could minimize the local citizens’
unnecessary radiation exposure. However, the
headquarters’ policy decision makers eventually
decided against the existing standard evacuation
policy of 3 kilometer radius of the F1 site. Instead
they decided to escalate the scale to a temporary
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exclusion zone of 10 kilometer (6.2 miles) at 3:59 on
March 12 [19].
Without the use of SPEEDI, the central
government was in the dark as to the predicted
directions of radio-active material flows. Logistically,
local governments needed to provide the public with
ground transportation, the evacuation centers, food,
water, heaters and blankets in the cold month of
March. Many roads were still totally or partially
impassable, causing the absolute shortage of gasoline
for cars [19].
Meanwhile, at the time of the central
government’s initial evacuation policy announcement
to the state and the local governments, TEPCO was
attempting to open four emergency bents manually to
avoid hydrogen explosions. Despite the highly risky
“heroic’ efforts made by TEPCO engineers who
determined to stay at the site to regain operational
control over the damaged nuclear reactors, the first
sighting of white smoke/steam was reported at the
No. 1 reactor. This incident accelerated the speed of
mass evacuations at 10:17 on March 12. Later at
15:36 first hydrogen explosions occurred at the No. 1
reactor before the initial mass evacuation was
completed [45].
The second hydrogen explosions at the No. 3
reactor occurred at 11:01 on March 14. Another
hydrogen explosions at the No. 2 reactor followed at
6:14 on March 15. In the immediate aftermath of the
explosions, TEPCO recorded an extremely dangerous
level of 817 microsieverts radioactive material near
the main gate. With the enfolding and escalating
nuclear disasters, the central government revised the
earlier 10 kilometer mass evacuation policy and
issued an escalated 20 kilometer (12 miles) radius
around the F1 site and a 30 kilometers (19 miles)
radius voluntary evacuation zone from the F1 site.
This revised mass evacuation policy was made again
without any SPEEDI predictions and meaningful
insights into the density and dispersion of radioactive
material subject to the prevailing weather and
geographical conditions for which SPEEDI was
designed, developed and was actually operated at the
time by MEXT [39]. Perhaps due to their own lack of
knowledge about SPEEDI capability as well as the
lack of openness and transparency on the part of
TEPCO senior executives, the nuclear emergency
response headquarters continued to revise the critical
mass evacuation policies in the dark and blindfolded
in the initial time-critical turbulent times.
Later when the Kan administration learned about
the SPEEDI predictive analytics distributed network
system, the Prime Minister with a Master’s degree in
engineering from Japan’s top engineering university
gathered a small group of trusted nuclear scientists

who had expert knowledge of SPEEDI predictive
modelling capabilities. The group through their
effective use of SPEEDI could rapidly answer the
technical questions the policy makers raised.
Importantly, for example, one scientist managed to
bypass the data quality problem related to ERSS and
produced usable and valuable predictive modelling
and analytics results through his intensive use of
SPEEDI for the policy makers [20].

5.3. Damage to perceived political efficacy
The various Fukushima Nuclear Accident
inquiry reports that were tabled severely criticized the
Kan administration’s ineffective and slow responses
to the escalating nuclear crisis, demanding his
resignation. In response DPJ Prime Minister Naoto
Kan resigned in August 2011 [50]. The opposition
party, LDP, won the parliamentary elections in
December 2012 and LDP Prime Minister Yoshihiko
Noda was inaugurated. More recently, Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe, the President of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) was inaugurated as the third
Abe administration in December 2014.
Both Prime Minister Naoto Kan and his Deputy
Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuyama experienced the
terror of the reactor meltdowns with its clear and
imminent danger which could end the nation. They
both reached the same conclusion: Japan must stop
its heavy reliance on 53 nuclear reactors for power
generation [29].
On the one hand, based on post-earthquake
assessments of the effectiveness of the existing
nuclear regulatory authority, a new nuclear regulatory
agency and new standards for nuclear power plants
were created [22, 53]. On the other hand, on March
16, 2016, the commissioners of Japan’s Nuclear
Regulation Authority (NRA) rejected a request made,
in December 2015, by 12 Japanese Prefectural
Governors that NRA need to continue to operating
SPEEDI to help determine best evacuation policy
options in the event of a severe accident [54]. Finally,
as for TEPCO, in February 2016, three former senior
executives responsible for the governance of the F1
operation, were criminally charged with professional
negligence resulting in deaths and injury for their role
in the 2011 “man-made” nuclear accident [14].

5.4. Barriers to proactive use of SPEEDI
On the surface, the general lack of technological
knowledge and understanding of SPEEDI system and
mistrust in data quality [24] were the key barriers to
proactive use of SPEEDI by the central government
in general and the key policy decision makers of the
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nuclear emergency response headquarters in
particular. Strategically, it is difficult to understand
the complete failure to use SPEEDI by the central
government, given the Directive, the existing legal
framework, mandates proactive use of SPEEDI once
the declaration of the national nuclear emergency is
made by the Prime Minister of Japan.
At deeper levels, however, there are underlying
political and institutional factors that contributed to
the general lack of technical knowledge and
understanding of SPEEDI predictive analytical
capabilities among Japan’s policy decision makers
and policy implementers. Politically, Japan’s central
governments rapidly and frequently changed, with 18
different prime ministers and 3 different political
parties (LDP 12 times, JNP once, JRP once, JSP once
and DPJ three times) since 1987 to the present which
roughly covers the period which SPEEDI was
conceptually designed, developed and operated. In
general, Japan’s central government pushed
technological innovations for economic development
and global competitiveness. But as the policy
decision makers so rapidly changed, the general
knowledge of SPEEDI might not be transferred from
one administration to another. Institutionally, there
has been serious problems of government silos and
technology fear [26] and inter-agency distrust [4; 9],
making inter-agency communication, collaboration
and knowledge sharing difficult.
The Nuclear Safety Technology Center
responsible for the operation of SPEEDI was located
within MEXT to safeguard citizens and society from
nuclear accidents, whereas the now defunct nuclear
regulatory authority at the time of the Fukushima
nuclear accident was located within the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry which has been the key
driver for nuclear energy policy and nuclear industry
development.

6. Discussion and Conclusion
As we discussed our key findings in the previous
section, MEXT used the SPEEDI predictive analytics
distributed network system to produce and distribute
the predictions, despite the ERSS data quality
problem without much delay in the aftermath of the
3.11 compound catastrophe that devastated
Fukushima, Miyagi and Iwate prefectures. Moreover,
MEXT used the predictions to dispatch monitoring
cars to the high-risk local areas, using the SPEEDIproduced geo-spatial maps, to collect radioactive
material release data in real time. These data replaced
the streaming big data that could not be provided by
ERSS, and hence improving the values of SPEEDI
predictive analytics over time. In addition to MEXT’s

proactive use of SPEEDI at the central government
level, the geospatial maps, outputs of SPEEDI
predictive analytics, were automatically sent to the
Fukushima Prefectural government which used the
predictions timely for enhancing their mass
evacuation policy decision making effectiveness. The
state government policy makers could urge some of
the local governments to launce immediate
evacuation operations, without waiting for the central
government’s much delayed initial evacuation policy
announcement. In stark contrast, the central
government policy decision makers failed to
proactively use SPEEDI.
Our results indicate how predictive analytics
systems are used – either proactively and intensively
or reactively or latently – seemed to facilitate (or
inhibit) the extent of strategic agility and operational
flexibility with which strategically and politically
critical policy decisions are made. Using the adapted
model of strategic decision-making effectiveness
[15], we interpret our key findings and argue that the
relative absence of procedural rationality (PR)
combined with the clear presence of political
behavior (PB) may explain the failed proactive use of
SPEEDI by the key policy decision makers of the
nuclear emergency response headquarters at the
central government. The deeper underlying inhibitive
barriers we discussed in the previous section may
have contributed to the relative absence of PR and the
clear presence of PB. In contrast, the proactive use of
SPEEDI by MEXT and the Fukushima Prefectural
government can show some evidence of the enabling
role of SPEEDI in increasing PR.
According to Mr. Tetsuro Fukuyama, the then
DPJ Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, Kan’s trusted
policy chief, the Cabinet policy makers struggled to
obtain accurate and timely information from TEPCO
on the extent of the damage to the F1 site [19]. Both
Fukuyama in his book and Prime Minister in his book
[29] expressed their high-level frustration with the
lack of competence of the TEPCO Fellow and other
nuclear technology experts in informing the policy
makers. This may be interpreted as the presence of
PB or the problem of extant knowledge divide
between TEPCO and the Japanese policy makers,
hence hindering cognitive absorptive capacity [1],
knowledge sharing [49] and trust in data quality [47].
In answering these questions, this study
contributes to new research on predictive analytics
use in government towards policy decision-making
effectiveness by increasing PR and controlling PB,
with the need for more input and analytical insights
from (1) the proactive use of predictive analytics, (2)
engagement of external experts through the shared
use of predictive analytics tools, and (3) through the
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distributed use of said tools, engagement of local
government decision makers who are tasked to
implement the central government’s evacuation
policy. We hold that such an open policy making will
create greater public values for citizens and society,
while mitigating political and institutional barriers in
turbulent times. However, we have research
limitations that result from not having access to the
policy decision makers through case interviews. Our
future research directions include the application of
the modified model of strategic decision-making
effectiveness, with the added concept of IT use, to
interview local-level policy decision makers.
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